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LABOR INTERESTS AND CORPORATE POWER 
MATTHEW T. BODIE*
ABSTRACT 
Labor unions exert significant power through collective bargaining, pension 
fund investing, and political advocacy. But in each of these areas, unions face 
inherent structural limitations that severely constrain these powers. Workers 
need participation rights in corporate governance to overcome the multiplicity 
of forces arrayed against them. And rather than obviating the need for unions, 
worker corporate power would facilitate a different kind of labor 
representation—a transition to labor power that advocates for occupational 
interests and forms coalitions across the shifting political interests of different 
worker groups. 
* Callis Family Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law. Special thanks to David 
Webber and the editors of the Boston University Law Review for the invitation to this 
Symposium. I am much obliged for comments from Catherine Fisk and Rebecca Hollander-
Blumoff. 
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INTRODUCTION
Unions fight for workers. The 1935 Wagner Act created the obligation for 
employers to bargain collectively with worker representatives, and by the mid-
1950s unions represented over one-third of the American workforce.1 Even 
today, unions represent 16.4 million workers, and their members average over 
$200 more a week in earnings than non-union workers.2 Unions also have a say 
in the control of trillions of dollars in pension holdings through public-sector 
pension funds and multiemployer funds.3 And in the political sphere, unions are 
among the biggest institutional spenders: in 2016, they donated $35 million to 
individual federal candidates and $132 million to super-political action 
committees.4 No other organizations or institutions come close to matching the 
power of unions when it comes to advocating on behalf of workers. 
At the same time, organized labor is now at its weakest—and the future seems 
bleak.5 Unions represent only 6.4% of all private-sector employees, a percentage 
which has continuously declined from its 1950s heyday.6 Corporate law in the 
United States has effectively removed workers from the governance of firms and 
given complete power to shareholders and C-suite management.7 Employee 
1 MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 10 tbl.1 
(1987) (illustrating that between 1950 and 1960 union membership was between 31.5% and 
34.7% of nonagricultural workers); LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK:
MEMBERSHIP, STRUCTURE, FINANCE DIRECTORY app. A at A-1 (1985) (illustrating that 32.5% 
of nonagricultural employment was unionized in 1953). 
2 Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Union 
Member Summary (Jan. 18, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2 
.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/C4YU-8X95] (“Among full-time wage and salary workers, union 
members had median usual weekly earnings of $1,051 in 2018, while those who were not 
union members had median weekly earnings of $860.”). 
3 See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST 
BEST WEAPON, at xii (2018) (putting the valuation of worker pension funds at $3-6 trillion). 
4 Dave Jamieson & Paul Blumenthal, Labor Unions Spent a Record Amount on the 
Elections. But Not as Much as These 5 People., HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 4:52 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/labor-union-election-
2016_us_58223b92e4b0e80b02cd7259 [https://perma.cc/LVU4-3EJW]. Unions were five of 
the top fifteen organizational contributors to political campaigns in the 2016 election cycle. 
Top Organization Contributors, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/ 
list.php?cycle=2016 [https://perma.cc/EX8E-ZSWE] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). 
5 See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 
1527, 1528 (2002) (“The labor laws have failed to deliver an effective mechanism of 
workplace representation, and have become nearly irrelevant, to the vast majority of private 
sector American workers.”); see also KATE ANDRIAS & BRISHEN ROGERS, REBUILDING 
WORKER VOICE IN TODAY’S ECONOMY 5 (2018), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/Rebuilding-Worker-Voices-final-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN45-
D6ZR] (“The precipitous decline of labor unions over the last few decades has had devastating 
consequences for American workers.”). 
6 See Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2. 
7 Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1864 (2003) (“[I]n the course of the twentieth century, legal scholars 
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pensions have shifted from primarily defined-benefit plans to defined-
contribution plans, which remove unions from the management of these funds.8
And changes to state, federal, and constitutional law have made it more difficult 
for unions to collect funds from the workers they represent, especially when such 
funds are earmarked for political advocacy.9 Meanwhile, fueled at least in part 
by labor’s decline, income inequality continues to widen. Workers’ wages have 
remained largely stagnant, while executive compensation and corporate profits 
climb higher. Rather than going into workers’ pockets, the vast majority of the 
2018 corporate tax cuts were plowed into stock buybacks.10
There are indications that, at long last, our New-Deal-era system of employee 
empowerment is primed for a redesign. The key is corporate power. Rather than 
remaining siloed outside of corporate governance, workers need a voice in the 
boardroom to provide a say in the management and control of the firm. Although 
such an approach has long been anathema to U.S. corporate law, recent 
developments have opened the door for a discussion of worker representation on 
corporate boards. Recent bills proposed by Senators Tammy Baldwin and 
Elizabeth Warren would provide workers with representation on the board of 
directors.11 New managerial methodologies providing for participatory 
management and employee voice are increasingly popular around the globe.12
and political theorists helped remove the interests of workers (as differentiated from 
shareholders, officers, and directors) from the core concerns of corporate law and theory.”). 
8 In 1981, 64.2% of all pension plan participants were in defined-benefit plans; that 
percentage declined to 27.7% in 2015. See EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,




9 See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2449 (2018) 
(eliminating responsibility of represented public-sector employees to pay union dues); 
Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox 
v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1029-47 (2013) (discussing First 
Amendment rights of unions and dissenting union members). 
10 Vanessa Fuhrmans, Tax Cuts Provide Limited Boost to Workers’ Wages, WALL STREET 
J. (Oct. 2, 2018, 7:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax-cuts-provide-limited-boost-to-
workers-wages-1538472600 (“U.S. companies are putting savings from the corporate tax cut 
to use, but only a fraction of it is flowing to employees’ wallets, new data show.”); Ben 
Popken, What Did Corporate America Do with That Tax Break? Buy Record Amounts of Its 
Own Stock, NBC NEWS (June 26, 2018, 3:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/ 
economy/what-did-corporate-america-do-tax-break-buy-record-amounts-n886621 
[https://perma.cc/9E6Q-9GQP]. 
11 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6 (2018); Reward Work Act, S. 
2605, 115th Cong. § 3 (2018). 
12 See, e.g., FREDERIC LALOUX, REINVENTING ORGANIZATIONS: A GUIDE TO CREATING 
ORGANIZATIONS INSPIRED BY THE NEXT STAGE OF HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS 55-61 (2014) 
(introducing “Teal Organizations” as new structure of organization that emphasizes “self-
management,” “wholeness,” and “evolutionary purpose”); BRIAN J. ROBERTSON,
HOLACRACY: THE NEW MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD 16-26 
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The Walkout for Change by Google workers demanded the appointment of an 
employee representative to Google’s board.13
Efforts at economic reforms to support worker power need organized labor’s 
support and advocacy. But unions face a set of competing interests that make 
any move towards employee corporate power more complicated. This potential 
for dissonance is similar to the conflicts faced by union and public pension funds 
in their management of labor’s capital. In both situations, unions have both 
convergence and divergence with the interests of the workers they represent. Of 
course, conflicts of interest are endemic to capitalism, and the current regulatory 
structure exacerbates the conflicts within labor interests. But these conflicts must 
also be recognized—and, to the extent possible, managed or ameliorated. 
Part I of this Article will provide a brief taxonomy of labor interests and will 
discuss the possibility for conflicts within those interests in three distinct areas: 
collective bargaining, pension fund management, and political advocacy. Part II 
will discuss the effects of labor interests on labor, employment, and corporate 
law and policy, as well as efforts at reform in these areas. Part III will discuss 
the potential role for unions in reshaping the economic landscape to provide 
workers with greater voice and power within corporate governance while 
remaining their representatives and advocates. Even in a dramatically changed 
corporate governance landscape, labor would retain its vital role in representing 
worker interests on the shop floor, in boardrooms, in legislatures, and in 
courtrooms.  
I. LABOR INTERESTS
Unions are often imagined as the pure distillation of employee sentiment and 
desires—the American worker in institutional form. However, like all 
institutional actors, unions face conflicts of interest in each of the settings in 
which they operate. Some of these conflicts are subtle, but they take on 
heightened importance when considering potential workplace reforms that 
might change their role. The following is a brief taxonomy of labor’s interests 
within their various spheres of influence and the potential for conflicts among 
these interests. 
A. Collective Bargaining Representation 
The most critical role for unions remains serving as the collective bargaining 
representative for workers who have chosen union representation. This role is 
established under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which requires 
employers to bargain with labor organizations when a majority of the workers 
(2015) (describing “holacracy,” new paradigm of organization which distributes authority to 
all individuals in organization). 
13 Noam Scheiber, Google Workers Reject Silicon Valley Individualism in Walkout, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/business/google-employee-
walkout-labor.html. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3641578
1128 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:1123 
in a particular bargaining unit have selected that representative.14 Although an 
employer has no obligation to reach an agreement with the union, it must 
continue to bargain in good faith until impasse.15 Unions also have certain 
protections, such as prohibitions on retaliation as well as a limited right to strike 
and engage in collective action, that enable them to exercise negotiating power.16
The NLRA envisions collective bargaining as the framework for labor-
management relations and unions as the employees’ agents within that 
framework. 
In any agency relationship, there will be divergence between the interests of 
the principal and the interests of the agent. It is important to recognize that union 
representation is, at root, an agency relationship. A representation election is a 
decision to purchase group representation services.17 Employees agree to pay 
the union in return for the services that the union provides. By electing the union 
as their representative, employees essentially designate the union as their 
representative in exchange for the payment of dues. An economically rational 
decision to choose union representation would be based on whether the 
employee expects that the union will, in fact, improve terms and conditions.18
And the appeal of unions is their ability to get more for employees than the 
employees would get on their own.  
Unions have a set of collective bargaining interests that converge and diverge 
from the interests of their employee members. As agents, unions are interested 
in getting the best deal for their employees under a collective bargaining 
agreement. However, like many agents, their interest in securing a given deal is 
likely stronger than their interest in fighting for the best possible deal. And the 
structure of the deals that unions negotiate is worth particular consideration. 
Collective bargaining agreements must cover the entire bargaining unit. As part 
of that agreement, unions generally demand a dues check-off provision whereby 
worker dues are automatically deducted from the employees’ paycheck.19 Dues 
14 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (2012). 
15 Id. § 158(d).  
16 See, e.g., id. § 158(a)(1), (3), (4), (b)(4)(i). 
17 Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for Union Representation, 94 VA. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2008). 
18 Or, put more precisely, “[i]f the expected utility from [the employees’] job becoming a 
union job is higher than from it not becoming a union job, then they will vote for the union.” 
Henry S. Farber & Daniel H. Saks, Why Workers Want Unions: The Role of Relative Wages 
and Job Characteristics, 88 J. POL. ECON. 349, 351 (1980). Of course, different employees 
will have different perspectives on the potential costs and benefits of unionization. See id. at 
367 (noting that individual employees vote for or against unionization “as if the effect of 
unionization on earnings is to raise average earnings and lower its dispersion”). 
19 In right-to-work states, employees can forego any payment to the union despite the 
union’s required representation, while in non-right-to-work states, a collective bargaining 
agreement can require all represented employees to pay that portion of the union dues that 
covers collective bargaining services. In Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 
U.S. 735 (1988), the Supreme Court differentiated between components of the dues and ruled 
that nonmembers need not pay the union for services that are not directly related to collective 
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are the primary source of funds for unions, and the primary—and to some extent 
the only sustainable—way to secure them is through a collective bargaining 
agreement with a union security clause. 
The need for dues sets up an obvious divergence between workers and unions. 
Like customers of any service, workers will want to pay as little as possible for 
union representation, while unions will want to charge higher rates. To some 
extent this conflict is ameliorated through regulation. Unions are almost always 
nonprofit associations due to antitrust, tax, and labor law.20 Under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“LMRDA”), a union must give its 
members “equal rights and privileges within such organization to nominate 
candidates, to vote in elections or referendums of the labor organization, to 
attend membership meetings, and to participate in the deliberations and voting 
upon the business of such meetings . . . .”21 Dues can only be increased through 
a vote by the majority of the membership.22 The LMRDA also imposes strict 
fiduciary duties on union officers and employees in carrying out their 
responsibilities on behalf of the members.23 At the same time, unions are 
independent institutions with their own sets of internal procedures, leadership, 
and employees. They generally have complete discretion in handling 
negotiations with employers. A union may even execute a collective bargaining 
agreement without any approval by the represented employees.24 The union is 
the employees’ representative; it is not a representation of them.  
Unions have engaged in a variety of worker-empowerment initiatives that 
help nonunionized workers, from efforts for guaranteed overtime pay during the 
New Deal up through the Fight for $15 for fast-food workers.25 But only dues 
secured through collective bargaining pay the bills. Unions are creatures of the 
NLRA and LMRDA—these statutes created the market for union representation, 
and they establish the parameters for it. These parameters include not only the 
bargaining services. Id. at 762-63 (holding that the NLRA “authorizes the exaction of only 
those fees and dues necessary to ‘performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the 
employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues’” (quoting Ellis v. Bhd. 
of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station, 466 U.S. 435, 448 
(1984)). 
20 See Bodie, supra note 17, at 40. The Clayton Act provides antitrust exemption for those 
labor organizations “instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock 
or conducted for profit . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 17 (2012). And nonprofit status affords tax benefits. 
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(5) (2012). For an argument for greater flexibility in union organizational 
design, see Samuel Estreicher, Deregulating Union Democracy, 2000 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
501, 516. 
21 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (2012). 
22 Id. § 411(a)(3). 
23 Id. § 501(a) (requiring, inter alia, that union agents “hold [the union’s] money and 
property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and 
expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the 
governing bodies adopted thereunder”). 
24 See Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793, 810 (1984). 
25 Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 47-51 (2016). 
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restrictions discussed above, but also the limitations on collective bargaining 
imposed under federal law. Employers need to bargain only about terms and 
conditions of employment; they need not discuss product development, 
corporate governance, or other areas within the “core of entrepreneurial 
control.”26 Collective bargaining in its design requires a divide between labor 
and management. Innovative forms of participatory management are 
unattractive to unions when such forms blur this division. 
Unions also have an interest in representing a broad category of workers 
across firms. They seek to take wages out of competition by securing 
representation for all of the workers in a relevant labor market.27 The larger 
percentage of workers that the union represents, the more market power the 
union has.28 And this market power will of course inure to the advantage of 
individual represented workers. However, this solidarity also means that 
workers will be tied together across firms, deemphasizing their allegiance to 
their individual firms. In other words, unions have an interest in the economic 
fortunes of a group of workers across firms as a unit, whereas individual workers 
have an interest not only in their unionized cohort, but also in their individual 
firm. A union has strong incentives not to negotiate a deal for workers at one 
firm that would be better for represented workers at a competing firm—the union 
wants all of its members to have the same deal. Recent pro-union labor law 
reforms have suggested getting unions out of bargaining at the enterprise/firm 
level entirely, and instead putting in place sectoral bargaining at the local, state, 
or even national level.29
The tension between in-group and out-group workers can also manifest itself 
between unions and their members. The AFL-CIO has enjoyed remarkable 
success in coalescing the labor movement into one collective group that pushes 
a pro-labor agenda, but even this success has had hiccups.30 The idea of a “labor 
movement” by necessity must downplay the inherent tensions between the 
different types of represented workers. Workers within the same industry are 
competing directly against each other within their firms; increased market share 
at one firm will decrease the share of the others. Workers in different industries 
may compete as substitutes for one another. And higher pay for workers will 
lead to increased costs for consumers—who are, after all, generally workers 
themselves. Moreover, unions may at times compete within firms as different 
sets of workers try to improve their terms and conditions of employment. The 
26 SAMUEL ESTREICHER & MATTHEW T. BODIE, LABOR LAW 134-39 (2016). 
27 ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 60 (1962) (“Unions in highly 
competitive industries . . . will almost always pursue a standard wage policy within a given 
product market.”). 
28 See DAVID ROLF, CENTURY FOUND., A ROADMAP TO REBUILDING UNION POWER 37-42 
(2018). 
29 ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 26-33. 
30 In 2005 several unions broke out of the AFL-CIO and the former “Change to Win” 
coalition. See Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 30, 2005, at 38. 
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airline industry, for example, has three primary sets of unionized workers: flight 
attendants, machinists, and pilots. Although these workers all share common 
cause against management and shareholders, they are also competing against 
each other for a larger share of wages.31 Private-sector workers see their taxes 
go to pay for public services provided by workers who are unionized at a 
significantly higher rate. Ultimately, the notion that “American workers” have a 
monolithic set of interests is belied by the many ways in which such workers 
and their industries are caught in capitalism’s eternal competition. And unions, 
as the representatives for a particular group of workers, will find themselves 
caught at times between the shifting sets of economic allies and adversaries for 
that particular group. 
B. Pension Fund Management 
Labor unions play an important role in the management of certain pension 
funds. On the private-sector side, union representatives serve as fiduciaries for 
pension plans provided through union funds as well as multiemployer plans.32
These pensions are generally defined-benefit plans, which means that the plan 
is responsible for paying retirees a fixed stipend for the remainder of the 
employee’s life.33 The plan must manage the funds so as to ensure that the plan 
can pay for the retiree benefits that come due. As a result, defined-benefit plans 
must carefully manage the contributions to the plan to make sure that they match 
up with the plan’s future obligations. In the public sector, unions similarly play 
a role in managing the funds of government-provided, defined-benefit plans. 
Although the plans are government entities, their managerial structures 
generally include representatives for the unions whose members receive the 
pensions.34 In contrast, unions do not manage defined-contribution plans, which 
provide individual employee accounts into which the employer and the 
employee contribute set amounts. These accounts, generally managed through a 
private institution such as a mutual fund company, are controlled by the 
individual employee and provide no assurance that sufficient funds will be 
available upon retirement. 
31 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Employee Ownership and Unions: Lessons from the Airline 
Industry, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION IN THE EMERGING WORKPLACE:
ALTERNATIVES/SUPPLEMENTS TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 573, 577-78 (Samuel Estreicher 
ed., 1998) (discussing power of pilots’ union). 
32 Plans administered by unions alone were common prior to the Taft-Hartley Act. Ewan 
McGaughey, Democracy in America at Work: The History of Labor’s Vote in Corporate 
Governance, 42 SEATTLE U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 24), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3246974. Fearful of consolidated union power in pensions, 
Congress prohibited employers from funding union-managed plans, instead requiring 
pensions to be jointly managed by management and labor. See 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2012);
COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 4-5 (5th ed. 2018). 
33 MEDILL, supra note 32, at 129-30. 
34 WEBBER, supra note 3, at xiv-xv. 
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The incentives of union pension-fund representatives are aligned with the 
interests of their beneficiaries in that both want to see the fund sufficiently 
funded to pay future benefits. A union will often represent current employees as 
well as retirees, and its current members would lose faith if promises to retirees 
were not kept. But to the extent there is discretion in assuring that current 
investment strategies meet future demand, unions have an interest in pursuing 
investments that at the least do not harm the economic interests of their current 
members. To this extent, union interests may diverge from those of the 
beneficiaries, who may care only about maximizing the probability of receiving 
their defined benefit by maximizing the funds in the plan. 
Another potential for divergence has captured the imaginations of a 
significant segment of corporate law scholars, as well as one court.35 They fear 
that unions and state and local governments may have nonshareholder interests, 
such as more jobs or higher wages, that outweigh their common interests with 
other shareholders.36 Because of their “special” interests, union and public-
sector pension funds may “pursue self-interested objectives rather than the goal 
of maximizing shareholder value.”37 However, union members could make a 
similar charge against union pension fund managers who do not take union 
interests into account. The money collected for these funds came from union 
workers, and it would be unfair for the plan to turn its back on the concerns of 
members who are still working their way through the system. As Professor 
David Webber has persuasively argued, union and public-sector pension fund 
managers have at least some obligation to all of their constituents to pursue 
policies that benefit the organization and its movement.38 But this divergence in 
35 See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 647 F.3d 1144, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the SEC “acted arbitrarily and capriciously” by not evaluating costs potentially 
imposed upon companies from shareholders representing special interests, such as union and 
government pension funds, based on an Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rule 
that required public companies to provide shareholders with information about, and the ability 
to vote for, shareholder-nominated candidates for the board of directors); STEPHEN 
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2008) 
(“Public employee pension funds are vulnerable to being used as a vehicle for advancing 
political/social goals of the fund trustees that are unrelated to shareholder interests 
generally.”); Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, 
Economics, and Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 378-83 (2010) (singling out labor unions and public 
pension funds as special-interest shareholders); Mark J. Roe, The Corporate Shareholder’s 
Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and in Washington, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 30 
(2012) (“[D]ecisionmakers at the SEC may indeed see agenda-driven activists . . . as having 
pernicious and costly side-agendas, but see these costs as more than offset if access improves 
the accountability of managers and boards. Or, less charitably, decisionmakers at the SEC 
may simply be captured by these Washington-savvy interests.”); Roberta Romano, Less is 
More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate 
Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 231-32 (2001) (arguing that union and public pension 
fund managers use shareholder proposals to accrue “private benefits”).  
36 Bus. Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151-52. 
37 Id. at 1152. 
38 WEBBER, supra note 3, at 254. 
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economic interests between shareholders, pension funds, and union members 
remains a recognized and persistent potential conflict. 
C. Political Advocacy 
Unions have developed into political actors that operate beyond the specific 
concerns of the workers they directly represent. For example, unions have come 
out in force to fight against right-to-work laws, most recently undoing Missouri 
legislation through a voter referendum.39 In theory, protection for fair-share 
union dues disadvantages individual workers by taking away their choice to pay 
dues or not. Protection for required collective-bargaining fees favors unions as 
institutions, rather than unions as agents for workers. Similarly, the Employee 
Free Choice Act, which came closest to passage in 2009-2010, provided for 
recognition through card-check and neutrality agreements that made it easier for 
unions to organize.40 Certain aspects of union advocacy necessarily focus on 
unions as institutions rather than the workers they represent. 
Perhaps counterintuitively, there are also numerous instances of unions acting 
against their short-term political and economic interests to support political 
causes that help workers generally. Unions have consistently supported 
“mandatory minimums” in the form of minimum-wage laws, overtime 
protections, occupational safety regulations, health and pension benefits, and 
protected employee leave.41 In all of these instances, the labor movement 
supported mandatory minimums that benefit all workers—not just those in 
unions. With each improvement in employment law, the need for individual 
workers to unionize weakened. But nevertheless unions pursued these reforms.42
Unions also enter into coalitions that may not always align with the spectrum 
of views held by individual members. Union political spending has primarily 
39 Kris Maher, Missouri Overturns ‘Right-to-Work’ Law in Referendum, WALL STREET J. 
(Aug. 8, 2018, 12:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/missouri-overturns-right-to-work-
law-in-referendum-1533699871. 
40 Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (amending 
National Labor Relations Act to expedite process of choosing representative for group of 
employees by immediately certifying the representative if no previous representative existed); 
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (same). However, that 
legislation also included the boosting of damages paid to individual employees, as well as 
required interest arbitration for failed first-contract negotiations. H.R. 1409 §§ 3-4 
(facilitating initial collective bargaining agreements and strengthening enforcement against 
unfair labor practices); S. 560 §§ 3-4 (same). 
41 See, e.g., Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective 
Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 170-71 (2013). 
42 As a counterexample that illustrates the union interests, a union official in Los Angeles 
initially argued that union workplaces should be exempt from a proposed minimum wage law 
so as to allow the unions more flexibility to bargain for higher benefits in lieu of the wage 
increase. Jana Kasperkevic, LA Unions Call for Exemption from $15 Minimum Wage They 
Fought for, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 2016, 9:22 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/apr/12/los-angeles-15-dollar-minimum-wage-unions [https://perma.cc/T5CT-W5 
BF]. 
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gone to Democratic candidates.43 Even if they like their union, some members 
likely have other political preferences that align more with Republicans, such as 
lower taxes, pro-life policies, or opposition to gay marriage. These preferences 
might be more important to an individual member than the candidates’ positions 
on labor. But unions are generally single-issue political actors and align their 
political activity with the party or coalition that best represents those interests. 
As a result, there may be dissonance between a union’s political support and the 
political preferences of individual union members.44
II. LABOR STRUGGLES
The past fifty years have been difficult for labor. Unions have faced obstacles 
in all three of their areas of engagement: collective bargaining, pension fund 
activism, and political advocacy. These troubles point to the need for a new 
direction in worker empowerment—a direction that leads through corporate 
governance, rather than collective bargaining. 
A. The Limitations of Collective Bargaining 
Collective bargaining is the raison d’etre of unions. Under the NLRA, 
employees can select a collective representative to negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment, and the employer must bargain with this 
representative in good faith.45 The employer need not agree to any specific set 
of terms, but it must bargain in good faith and abide by the complex legal system 
for managing this bargaining relationship.46 The duty to bargain forces 
employers to come to the table and has had a demonstrable effect on employee 
fortunes. Although the exact economic ramifications are contested, there is a 
consensus that collective bargaining increases wages among employees on an 
individual-firm level.47
43 Top Organization Contributors, supra note 4 (noting that 90% of union campaign 
contributions in 2016 went to Democrats). 
44 See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Opinion, What Unions Got Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 
2016, at SR2 (noting that in the 2016 presidential election, Clinton received only narrowly 
more support from voters in union households, despite receiving bulk of union political 
spending on presidential race). 
45 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (d), 159(a)-(b) (2012) (setting forth duty to bargain and 
establishing process to select employees’ collective representative). 
46 Id. § 158(d). 
47 See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 43-60 (1984) 
(discussing studies of union wage effect); David G. Blanchflower & Alex Bryson, What Effect 
Do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would Freeman and Medoff Be Surprised?, 25 J. LAB.
RES. 383, 391 (2004) (finding 17% private-sector union wage effect and 14.5% public-sector 
union wage effect in late 1990s). 
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Unions were able to change the income-distribution dynamics in the mid-
twentieth century by economic force.48 They collectivized employees 
throughout important industries such as auto-manufacturing, truck driving, and 
steel production, and they used strikes and other forms of economic pressure to 
push up the employees’ wages and benefits.49 However, collective bargaining is 
no longer a vehicle for anything more than a small percentage of workers to 
interact and bargain with management. The percentage of unionized private-
sector employees has been steadily shrinking since its 1950s heyday, from a high 
of about 35% to the current 6.4%.50 And there is not much chance of that trend 
reversing. The failure of labor-friendly legislation to pass during the first Obama 
Administration, when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress, indicates 
the improbability of pro-union statutory change.51 Indeed, the recent political 
climate has seen erosion in union membership, as states such as Michigan and 
Wisconsin become right-to-work states and also make it more difficult for 
public-sector workers to organize.52
Moreover, there is a larger structural problem with labor law. The NLRA 
clearly creates zones of power and influence that exist outside the internal 
business organizational structure. Employers are only required to bargain on 
specific topics that could be considered “mandatory” subjects of bargaining.53
Mandatory subjects are limited primarily to the terms of the employment 
contract; management has no duty to negotiate over issues such as product 
development, executive compensation, financial structuring, and firm 
48 See Nicholas Kristof, Opinion, The Cost of a Decline in Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2015, at A25 (describing how unions have been integral to maintaining middle class and 
suggesting that decline in unions has led to income inequality). 
49 See JAKE ROSENFELD, WHAT UNIONS NO LONGER DO 1-2 (2014) (describing how unions 
were “the core equalizing institution” for income equality). 
50 Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 2 (observing that 6.4% 
of private-sector workers are members of unions in 2018); see also TIMOTHY NOAH, THE 
GREAT DIVERGENCE: AMERICA’S GROWING INEQUALITY CRISIS AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT 128 (2012) (discussing decline in union membership). 
51 See Harold Meyerson, Opinion, Under Obama, Labor Should Have Made More 
Progress, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/09/AR2010020902465.html (discussing failure of Employee 
Free Choice Act). 
52 See Monica Davey, Unions Suffer Latest Setback in Midwest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2015, at A1 (discussing how Democratic Party and Republican Party view right-to-work 
legislation). This leaves out the policy changes that are making public-sector union 
membership more difficult and less desirable. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin 
Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 293, 293-94 (2012) 
(describing Wisconsin’s “unprecedented attack on public-sector bargaining”). 
53 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958) (discussing 
mandatory subjects of collective bargaining). 
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governance.54 The idea that the “core of entrepreneurial control”55 is reserved to 
the employer itself is central to the federal system of collective bargaining. 
Employers may be forced to talk with unions about wages and benefits, but they 
have no duty to talk about how they run the business.56 In creating these divided 
fields of engagement, the NLRA fenced employees and their representatives out 
of any real participation in the firm’s management.57
Labor law scholars and advocates have proposed idea upon idea, program 
after program, to revitalize and resurrect union membership.58 One current 
reform agenda focuses on the importance of sectoral bargaining and the potential 
for new legal frameworks that would foster a sectoral approach.59 I am hopeful 
that this new wave of reform, championed by academics and labor leaders, will 
stick. However, any effort to reconstruct the past history of union representation 
would be built upon a collective-bargaining structure that would retain its 
inherent weaknesses, with unions and their represented members separated from 
the seat of true power within their companies. 
B. The Inefficacy of Pension Fund Activism 
Partisans on both sides agree on the power of union pension funds. Supporters 
of the funds believe this power is exercised primarily to salutary effect, whereas 
critics claim that pension fund activism causes a variety of distortions and 
contortions in corporate governance. In reality, union and public-sector pension 
funds have been important advocates for shareholder democracy and have not 
54 See id. (emphasizing party’s freedom to bargain or not bargain over other subjects). 
55 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (discussing mandatory subjects’ limitations, including how managerial decisions 
lie outside scope of mandatory subjects); see also James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law 
II: Solidarity, Entrepreneurship, and the Deep Agenda of the Obama NLRB, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 
653, 658 (2009) (“The doctrine [of entrepreneurial control] provides the focal point for a 
coherent and positive conception of employer interests that has come to permeate the labor 
law.”).
56 See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 379 U.S. at 223 (explaining how every decision 
made that may affect job security does not trigger mandatory bargaining). 
57 See Edward Silver & Joan McAvoy, The National Labor Relations Act at the 
Crossroads, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 181, 187 (1987) (explaining criticisms of the NLRA and 
NLRB, including that the NLRA provides inadequate protection against management). 
58 To name just a few of the books, see, for example, ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE 
WORKERS’ LAW: HOW TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 2-15 (2006); CYNTHIA 
ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 165-
69 (2010); JULIUS G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES A MOVEMENT 
269-70 (2010); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 226-27 (1990). 
59 ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 26-33 (arguing that sectoral bargaining removes 
collective-action problems, is democratic, and can improve working conditions more 
effectively than firm-based bargaining); ROLF, supra note 28, at 37-44 (analyzing success of 
sectoral bargaining in Europe and suggesting potential success of sectoral bargaining in 
United States). 
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used their power opportunistically. But neither has this activism been all that 
successful in increasing the power of the funds or their beneficiaries. Ultimately, 
the funds have done more for shareholder-oriented corporate governance than 
they have for union workers. 
In their 1998 study of corporate governance activity by union pension funds, 
Professors Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas found not “a socialist or 
proletarian plot,” but rather “a model for any large institutional investor 
attempting to maximize return on capital.”60 Unions had become model 
shareholder activists, using their power to drive a message that benefitted their 
fellow shareholders. In particular, Schwab and Thomas praised “the innovative 
methods unions have developed to get corporations to listen to traditional 
shareholder complaints.”61 Pension funds may have been louder—and at times 
more effective—than their mutual-fund counterparts, but they were seeking the 
same goals. And this approach has remained the pension funds’ playbook for the 
last twenty years. Pension-fund managers have been at the forefront in 
governance efforts to strengthen shareholder voting rights,62 rein in the power 
of the CEO,63 and fight fraud and abuse by insiders.64 These efforts all redound 
to the benefit of shareholders as a group. 
Despite the rock-solid evidence of pension fund support for shareholder 
interests, the bogeyman of unions and pension funds running amok is popular in 
a certain segment of corporate law literature.65 These funds have been singled 
out for having interests different than other shareholders—namely, interests in 
worker rights. One example of this predilection is almost always trotted out in 
support of the theory: the 2004 campaign by CalPERS to withhold shareholder 
support for certain Safeway directors.66 The campaign allegedly targeted these 
directors because of Safeway’s hard-line negotiations with the United Food and 
60 Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1018, 1019-20 (1998). 
61 Id. at 1022. 
62 WEBBER, supra note 3, at 45-78. 
63 Id. at 111-51. 
64 Id. at 172. 
65 One empirical study has found that AFL-CIO affiliated shareholders are more likely to 
support director-nominees by the incumbent board once the AFL-CIO no longer represents 
workers at a given firm. See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor 
Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 187 (2012). The 
study focused on the split between the AFL-CIO and the Change to Win coalition of unions, 
and examined the behavior of AFL-CIO funds with respect to directors at Change to Win 
companies. Id. at 188. Overall, Professor Agrawal found that the AFL-CIO funds voted for 
director nominees 65% of the time and a Change to Win union (the Carpenters) voted 75% of 
the time, while three different index funds supported the director-nominees 89 to 98% of the 
time. Id. at 195 tbl.1. Among other issues, Agrawal assumes that the index funds’ votes reflect 
a policy of shareholder wealth maximization. He does not demonstrate why a vote for 
incumbent directors equals a vote for shareholder wealth maximization; it could, in fact, 
represent the opposite. 
66 See Grundfest, supra note 35, at 382-83. 
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Commercial Workers (“UFCW”). In the end, however, only 17% of the shares 
voted against the directors targeted by CalPERS.67 The CalPERS-Safeway 
example has been used over and over to demonstrate the potential for unions and 
pension funds to pressure directors into caving to specialized labor demands.68
But the example itself demonstrates the lack of such potential. CalPERS and the 
other pension funds involved had legitimate corporate governance concerns to 
raise along with their union-oriented concerns; they did not nakedly assert 
nonshareholder interests.69 And even if the drive were simply a naked pursuit of 
union interests, their exercise of power netted only 17% of the total shareholder 
vote, and also led to the ouster of the CalPERS chair who had orchestrated the 
campaign.70 The imbroglio was a complete fiasco for CalPERS. It is hardly 
evidence that unions and pension funds exercise their ballot-box power to crush 
their fellow shareholders.71
In my view, union pension funds have not done enough to push a pro-worker 
agenda. There are opportunities for unions to advocate for, as an example, 
worker referenda on transformative corporate transactions.72 But getting 
67 Id. at 383. Moreover, the directors would have still been reelected, even if a majority 
had voted to withhold their votes, because no other candidates were running against them. 
68 See, e.g., Agrawal, supra note 65, at 193; Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary 
Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1285-86 (2008) (characterizing 
CalPERS-Safeway proxy battle as “high profile” example of “ways activist investors can use 
their shareholder status to push for favorable treatment in their other dealings with the firm”); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 1735, 1755 n.100 (2006) (“In what may be the best known recent example of this 
phenomenon, the pension fund of the union representing Safeway workers used its position 
as a Safeway shareholder in an attempt to oust the CEO, who had stood up to the union in 
collective bargaining negotiations.”); Jill E. Fisch, Securities Intermediaries and the 
Separation of Ownership from Control, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 877, 883 (2010) (“CalPERS’s 
activism at Safeway was criticized as resulting from President Sean Harrigan’s personal pro-
union sympathies.”); John F. Olson, Reflections on a Visit to Leo Strine’s Peaceable Kingdom, 
33 J. CORP. L. 73, 76-77 (2007) (“[T]he 2004 Safeway-CalPERS fiasco demonstrates the 
conflicts of interest union pension funds may harbor.”); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2524-25 (2005) (“The press, or at least the conservative press, 
thought that CalPERS was not acting in its beneficiaries’ interest as stockholders, but rather 
was motivated by a desire to change Safeway’s labor policy.”). 
69 Marc Lifsher, CalPERS to Withhold Votes on Safeway CEO, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2004, 
at C2 (“CalPERS said it would withhold its votes for Safeway Chairman and Chief Executive 
Steven Burd because of a 60% drop in Safeway’s stock since early 2001 that the pension fund 
said wiped out $20 billion in market value. CalPERS officials also cited what they described 
as conflicts of interest and a lack of responsiveness to shareholder concerns.”). 
70 Tom Petruno, Business Applauds Shake-Up at CalPERS, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at 
A1. 
71 David Webber frames the episode more hopefully in his book. See WEBBER, supra note 
3, at 30-31. However, Webber acknowledges that none of the incumbent Safeway directors 
lost, Safeway CEO Steven Burd stayed on in his position until 2013, and CalPERS chair Sean 
Harrigan was forced out of his position by the end of the year. Id.
72 See generally Matthew T. Bodie, The Case for Employee Referenda on Transformative 
Transactions as Shareholder Proposals, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 897 (2010). 
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sufficient shareholder support for a worker-oriented agenda would admittedly 
be challenging. “Special interest” shareholders have supported reforms that 
support overall shareholder value because only items on the shared shareholder 
agenda will get majority votes. Efforts by one group of shareholders to elect a 
director who would cater to their unique interests would be met with indifference 
or hostility from their fellow shareholders. At most, pension funds could 
repeatedly force incumbent boards to incur costs in defending themselves—and 
then go on to lose.73 Similar to Professor Webber, I am more optimistic that there 
might be some narrow ground for pension funds to push for more worker-
friendly policies, perhaps through horse-trading with other investor groups.74
But the strategy of shareholder politics remains difficult for pension funds. 
Even if union pension funds were successful shareholder advocates for 
worker interests, it may already be too late to successfully push a pro-worker 
agenda. As noted above, the collective-bargaining relationships that engendered 
these funds have been dwindling over time. While the funds can outlast the 
representation, at some point the lack of ongoing union representation catches 
up with the amount in the funds. In addition, the trend in pensions has been away 
from defined-benefit plans towards defined-contribution plans. Defined-benefit 
plans provide specified benefits to retirees, generally based on a formula that 
includes years of service, while defined-contribution plans put a certain amount 
of money into an individual account that the retiree then has access to upon 
retirement.75 Over the years, defined-contribution plans, particularly 401(k) 
plans, have become a much more popular option for private companies.76
Because individual account holders manage their own accounts in most defined-
contribution plans, they wield significantly less power in corporate governance 
than do participants in defined-benefit pension funds.77 Defined-benefit plans 
still enjoy robust support in the public sector. But these funds have been under 
attack from conservative activists like the Koch brothers, who contend that 
73 Professor Joseph Grundfest has provided a theory arguing that union and pension fund 
shareholders could use SEC Rule 14a-11 as a “megaphone” to get across their message and, 
in some cases, secure concessions from sensitive boards. Grundfest, supra note 35, at 378-83. 
Grundfest asserts that these shareholders can use the nomination process to gain additional 
publicity “at very little cost” and “need not even come close to winning.” Id. at 379. His 
parade of horribles includes union-nominated board candidates who want to “limit the export 
of jobs to foreign factories, or to close down foreign factories in order to bring manufacturing 
jobs back to America,” or candidates who want to “cap all executive salaries at a multiple of 
the average hourly wage of the rank and file,” or who want to “comply with emissions 
standards that reduce global warming but that place the corporation at a competitive 
disadvantage in the marketplace.” Id. at 381. 
74 See WEBBER, supra note 3, at 246-50. 
75 MEDILL, supra note 32, at 126-30. 
76 Id. at 133-35. 
77 WEBBER, supra note 3, at 214-20. 
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generous public sector pensions are too much of a drain on the public fisc.78
Although the recent bull market has buoyed many public-sector pension funds, 
a crash would likely put many funds underwater—raising concerns about their 
continuing viability.79
Funds like CalPERS will continue to be important players—both because of 
the size of California and its government, as well as the lack of hostility towards 
public-sector unions in that state. But even in California, an ongoing stream of 
ballot initiatives proposes an end to defined-benefit plans for public 
employees.80 Stasis would seem to be the best possible outcome—and stasis may 
be optimistic. 
C. The Diminishing Power of Political Advocacy 
Unions have significant political power in the United States—as an interest 
group, they have no equal when it comes to worker advocacy. But even though 
unions provide significant financial and manpower support to political 
campaigns, their funding is ultimately dwarfed by funding from Wall Street. 
Corporate leaders and financiers provide significantly more money to political 
campaigns than do unions.81 In fact, a relatively small number of families have 
provided a huge chunk of the overall political donations.82 Battling these titans 
of modern capital is a losing proposition. 
The federal government’s campaign-funding regime regulates union political 
activity in much the same way as it regulates the activity of corporations.83 So, 
just as Citizens United v. FEC84 allowed for corporate political spending on 
individual campaigns, the case also allows for new possibilities for unions.85
78 Id. at 221-25; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Address, Is Bankruptcy the Answer for 
Troubled Cities and States?, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1063, 1084 (2013) (discussing “unsustainable 
pension promises”). 
79 See WEBBER, supra note 3, at 226-27 (discussing debate about underfunding of public 
pensions). 
80 Id. at 222-23 (discussing proposed act to “change the California constitution to end 
defined-benefit pension plans for all California public employees hired on or after January 1, 
2019”). 
81 Jamieson & Blumenthal, supra note 4. 
82 Nicholas Confessore, Sarah Cohen & Karen Yourish, The Families Funding the 2016 
Presidential Election, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2015/10/11/us/politics/2016-presidential-election-super-pac-donors.html (“These donors’ 
fortunes reflect the shifting composition of the country’s economic elite. . . . Most built their 
own businesses, parlaying talent and an appetite for risk into huge wealth: They founded 
hedge funds in New York, bought up undervalued oil leases in Texas, made blockbusters in 
Hollywood.”). 
83 Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The Future of Labor Speech 
Rights?, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (noting that “Citizens United also applies to 
labor unions, freeing them to spend general treasury funds on electioneering”). 
84 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
85 See id. at 324; Matthew T. Bodie, Labor Speech, Corporate Speech, and Political 
Speech: A Response to Professor Sachs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 206, 207 (2012) (“The 
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However, unions face an additional set of federal and constitutional restrictions 
on their freedom as political actors that do not encumber corporations. Unlike 
corporations, unions cannot spend on politics whatever they have in their 
treasury. In a series of cases interpreting both the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) 
and the NLRA, the Supreme Court held that unions cannot require objecting 
nonmembers to pay for costs outside those incurred in collective bargaining.86
Outside of states with right-to-work provisions, unions may require both 
members and nonmembers to pay for the union’s costs of representing the 
bargaining unit.87 However, there are limitations on the types of expenses that 
can be charged to nonmembers. Objecting nonmembers must only pay their 
portion of those expenses that were “necessarily or reasonably incurred for the 
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees 
in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.”88 Political spending 
is the quintessential type of expenditure that cannot be charged to objectors.89
This line of jurisprudence requiring a separation between collective-
bargaining expenses and “unrelated” expenses has been roundly attacked by 
legal academia.90 Much of the commentary has focused on statutory 
interpretation and congressional intent, arguing that Congress did not mean to 
curtail the union’s political activity.91 But on a broader level, the notion that 
political spending is somehow external or superfluous to the core representation 
obligation is misguided. Unions need to lobby to protect their institutional 
interests, just as corporations often engage in extensive lobbying in order to 
Citizens United decision opened up the potential for corporations and unions to give unlimited 
amounts of money in support of politicians and their campaigns for office.”). 
86 See Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 763 (1988); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., 
Airline & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Emps., 466 U.S. 435, 455 
(1984); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-70 (1961). 
87 NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744-45 (1963) (permitting “agency shop” 
agreements whereby unions charge nonmembers for the costs of collective representation). 
88 Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. 
89 Beck, 487 U.S. at 740 (finding that objectors need not participate in “the union’s 
expenditure of their fees on activities such as . . . lobbying for labor legislation, and 
participating in social, charitable, and political events”); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 367 U.S. 
at 766-69 (construing statute as “not vesting the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted 
money”). 
90 See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National 
Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 51, 103-18 (1990) (criticizing Court’s interpretation of NLRA in Beck); 
George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law, 15 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 230 (1994) (stating that there is “much to criticize” when 
discussing Beck); Charles R. Virginia, Comment, Communications Workers v. Beck: 
Supreme Court Throws Unions Out on Street, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 666 (1989) 
(concluding that Court’s interpretation of NLRA was “flawed”).
91 See, e.g., Beck, 487 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s 
holding “simply cannot be derived from the plain language of the statute”); Dau-Schmidt, 
supra note 90, at 74-76 (arguing that Court’s decision ran contrary to congressional intent). 
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further their corporate objectives.92 Given the pervasive and fluctuating schemes 
of government regulation, it would be foolhardy for companies not to be 
engaged in the political process.93 The same logic arguably applies even more 
to unions, whose business is subject to intense regulation. Such regulation plays 
a role even outside the core provisions of the NLRA; state law covers such 
critical topics as right-to-work status, public-sector unionization, and the 
regulation of public demonstrations.94 Recent anti-labor efforts in Michigan and 
Wisconsin show what can happen when unions lose political support at the state 
level.95
Public-sector unions now face a more existential threat after Janus v. 
American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees.96 Finding that 
all activities of public-sector unions related to matters of public interest, the 
Court ruled that unions cannot negotiate with state governments for the 
collection of dues at any level without the permission of individual workers.97
In essence, the Court held that the Constitution requires that all public-sector 
employment be right-to-work.98 Up until summer 2018, the Court had held that 
unions could bargain for the automatic collection of dues for expenses-related 
collective bargaining, while employees could opt out of non-collective-
bargaining expenses such as political donations.99 At this point, states still allow 
workers to opt out of collective-bargaining fees entirely and still be represented. 
Although this dynamic may change, the Janus decision has, at the very least, 
made it harder for unions to raise funds under traditional and settled mechanisms 
92 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 147-48 n.46 (2003) (“Labor and business leaders 
believe—based on experience and with good reason—that such access gives them an 
opportunity to shape and affect governmental decisions and that their ability to do so derives 
from the fact that they have given large sums of money to the parties.” (quoting McConnell 
v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 498 (D.D.C. 2003))), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 
U.S. 310 (2010); Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1500 (2005) (“[C]orporate demand for political activity is a natural 
response to the effect of legal rules on business operations.”). 
93 Fisch, supra note 92, at 1570 (“Regulation has become an important factor for U.S. 
businesses. As a result, corporate political activity must be integrated within a corporation’s 
overall business strategy, and corporations need to develop and manage their political capital 
in the same way that they manage other business assets.”). 
94 Christopher L. Erickson et al., Justice for Janitors in Los Angeles and Beyond, in THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF UNIONS: NEW FORMS OF REPRESENTATION 38, 38-42 (Phanindra V. 
Wunnava ed., Routledge 2015). 
95 Joseph Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty 
Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511, 532-36 (2013). 
96 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
97 Id. at 2478. 
98 See id.
99 See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223-24 (1977) (finding agency shop 
clauses authorizing unions to automatically collect dues from nonmember public employees 
constitutionally valid), overruled by Janus v. Am. Fed. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., 138 S. 
Ct. 2448 (2018). 
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such as union security fees.100 There is even some speculation that the Court 
might next turn to collective-bargaining fees in the private sector.101
III. LABOR AND CORPORATE POWER
We can no longer expect collective bargaining to empower most American 
workers. That model no longer works. We need a new system of corporate 
empowerment that puts workers directly at the center of firm governance. At the 
same time, however, we must recognize that unions are the primary institutional 
bulwark for workers’ economic and political power in the United States, with 
decades of negotiating, legal, and political experience in getting workers a better 
deal. Unions will still retain a critical role in our economic ecosystem, even if 
we radically change our approach to worker power. This Part offers a 
preliminary sketch of how this transition may work. 
A. Worker Power Within the Firm 
The ultimate goal for worker empowerment should be participating in the 
governance structure of the business. Even though labor and equity contributors 
are the two primary sets of ongoing participants in the economic firm, firms are 
generally governed solely by equity.102 Employees should have governance 
rights that provide access to, engagement with, and some degree of control over 
the management of the business. The most obvious example of a robust set of 
participatory governance structures is Germany’s system of codetermination. 
Codetermination requires that employees at large companies choose 50% of the 
company’s supervisory board.103 The supervisory board is akin to the U.S. 
corporation’s board of directors, in that both play primary roles in choosing the 
company’s upper management and making organizational decisions such as 
mergers, acquisitions, and dissolution. Shareholders elect the other 50% of 
supervisory board members, and the board’s otherwise nonvoting chair has the 
100 Alana Semuels, Is This the End of Public-Sector Unions in America?, ATLANTIC (June 
27, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/janus-afscme-public-sector-
unions/563879/ [https://perma.cc/2QCM-2MU8]. 
101 Alexia Elejalde-Ruiz, Janus Ruling Could Undercut Private Sector Unions Too, CHI.
TRIB., July 10, 2018, at C1. 
102 For further discussion of the role of the employee within the economic firm, see 
Matthew T. Bodie, Employment As Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 830-36 (2017). 
103 Katharina Pistor, Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance 
Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163, 174-75 (Margaret M. Blair 
& Mark J. Roe eds., 1999). The 50% requirement applies to companies with more than 2,000 
employees. Companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees must have 30% employee 
representation on the supervisory board. See Otto Sandrock & Jean J. du Plessis, The German 
System of Supervisory Codetermination by Employees, in GERMAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN CONTEXT 167, 178 (Jean J. du Plessis et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2017). 
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tie-breaking vote.104 Recently, two bills have proposed American versions of 
codetermination, in which employee representatives would serve on corporate 
boards of directors. The Accountable Capitalism Act, proposed by Senator (and 
presidential candidate) Elizabeth Warren, would require companies with more 
than $1 billion in average revenue to have employees select at least 40% of the 
seats on the board.105 Senator Tammy Baldwin has authored the Reward Work 
Act, which proposes that one-third of directors be selected directly by 
employees.106 Both of these proposals reflect the work of progressive corporate 
law scholars who have advocated for more direct employee involvement in 
corporate governance.107
Putting employee representatives onto boards of directors would give workers 
real power within the corporation, and it would avoid many of the problems that 
inhere in a system that relies solely on collective bargaining. With workers in 
power on the board, they would have a say in all issues relating to the firm—not 
just those issues related to their own terms and conditions of employment. The 
benefits of this expanded scope would be two-fold. First, workers would have 
more power to steer the corporation’s “entrepreneurial” decisions (such as 
mergers and acquisitions, new product lines, and advertising) in ways that look 
out for their own interests. Second, corporations would get the benefit of 
employee expertise at the director level.108 Giving employees a voice in 
corporate governance will completely shift our current oligarchical approach 
104 See Sandrock & du Plessis, supra note 103, at 178. One notable exception to this 
structure is Volkswagen, in which the German state of Lower Saxony also was given seats on 
the supervisory board, giving workers de facto control. JACK EWING, FASTER, HIGHER,
FARTHER: THE VOLKSWAGEN SCANDAL 57 (2017). 
105 Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 6(b)(1) (2018). 
106 Reward Work Act, S. 2605, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018). 
107 See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 16 (1995) (arguing that boards of directors 
should take into account the effects of their decisions on all of the corporation’s stakeholders, 
including employees); Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 
STETSON L. REV. 69, 84-89 (2015) (advocating for corporate governance reform to provide 
employees with larger voice); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 
B.C. L. REV. 283, 287 (1998) (“[W]orkers should have some kind of representation on the 
board of directors or have some role in electing directors, and . . . directors of companies 
should be held to have some kind of fiduciary duties to workers in the employ of their firm.”); 
Robert Hockett, Why (Only) ESOPs?, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 84, 85 (2006) (arguing for a 
broader approach to the “ownership society” through employee ownership); Brett H. 
McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 429, 429-30 (2011) (discussing possible strategies for creating a role for employees in 
corporate governance). 
108 See Matthew T. Bodie, Workers, Information, and Corporate Combinations: The Case 
for Nonbinding Employee Referenda in Transformative Transactions, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 
871, 898-913 (2007) (discussing insights provided by employee input about board-level 
corporate decisionmaking). 
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and will open up the possibility of greater synergy between employers and 
employees.109
Employee board representation would change, but not obviate, the role of 
unions within the workplace. Board representation would provide employees 
with a platform from which to build a stronger position within company 
governance. Unions could play an important role in working with employees to 
develop the expertise and strategies necessary to play their new supervisorial 
role. Labor organizations have already worked closely with shareholder 
advocacy groups in promoting corporate governance reform; board 
representation would enable these groups to work even more closely together in 
pursuing their joint interests of firm wealth maximization and managerial 
oversight.110 Further, board representation would lead naturally to some version 
of collective bargaining, as management—still controlled by shareholders under 
Senators Warren’s and Baldwin’s proposals—would need to establish workers’ 
terms and conditions of employment. With employee board representation, labor 
will feel less like a cost to be managed and more like part of the team to be 
included. Board representation will facilitate union influence, not replace it. It is 
not surprising that labor leaders have supported it.111
Complementary reforms could also help ensure a more robust role for unions 
on the traditional shop-floor level. Germany is one of several European countries 
that provide for works councils—firm-level or worksite-level organizations that 
consult with management on issues of day-to-day employment.112 As stand-
alone bodies, works councils give employees more voice, but they provide little 
power, as they cannot negotiate on behalf of workers and generally are not 
empowered to change corporate policy.113 But as part of a larger framework of 
worker empowerment, works councils could allow workers—with the expertise 
and experience of unions—to translate the governance power into concrete 
results in workers’ daily lives. 
109 For a discussion of innovative managerial structures that provide for more employee 
empowerment, see LALOUX, supra note 12, at 55-61; ROBERTSON, supra note 12, at 16-31. 
110 See Schwab & Thomas, supra note 60, at 1023 (claiming that “much union-shareholder 
activity represents an alignment of shareholder and worker interests that attempts to prod 
management to increase the overall worth of the firm”). 
111 Jake Johnson, To Curb Capitalism’s Toxic Impacts, Warren Unveils Plan to Give 
Workers More Control Over Corporate Decisions, COMMON DREAMS (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.commondreams.org/news/2018/08/15/curb-capitalisms-toxic-impacts-warren-
unveils-plan-give-workers-more-control-over [https://perma.cc/Q5WL-HA82] (“Applauding 
Warren’s new bill in a tweet on Wednesday, AFL-CIO president Richard Trumka declared, 
‘It’s time to rewrite the rules so our economy works for working people, not just those at the 
top.’”). 
112 ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 25. 
113 Some U.S. companies have used versions of works councils that do in fact have de 
facto power within the internal hierarchy. See Crown Cork & Seal Co., 334 N.L.R.B. 699, 
701-02 (2001) (describing de facto power of one such set of internal committees).
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Collective bargaining has a rich history and proud tradition within our 
economic framework. However, time has shown that it cannot subsist on its own. 
Most labor advocates have pushed for more of the same when it comes to labor-
law reform—changes that make it easier for unions to represent more workers.114
In my view, we need reform at the corporate level to expect the dynamics to 
shift.115 Unions will play a critical role not only in advocating for this shift, but 
also in translating employee governance power into worker economic gains. 
B. Worker Power Across Firms 
If workers are given more power within firms, then that power will become 
more contested. Specifically, there is significant potential for workers to fight 
among themselves when they have a voice in critical corporate decisions.116
Hierarchies and markets will continue to cause certain professions and 
occupations to hold greater economic power than others. Unions have played, 
and will play, an important role in providing collective market power not just to 
workers as an undifferentiated whole, but also to specific groups of workers who 
engage in particular types of jobs. As employees get more power within firms, 
unions should provide more collective power for subsets of employees across 
firms as a counterbalance to firm and industry power.  
Many unions are already fulfilling this role of a professional- or occupational-
trade association. It is the old American Federation of Labor model—unions 
represent particular trades and crafts, rather than employer-wide wall-to-wall 
industrial units.117 A more trade- or occupational-oriented union movement 
would have several advantages moving forward. First, different unions would 
be better positioned to represent separate groups of employees within a 
corporation. Rather than expecting one union to represent the needs of a 
variegated set of workers, unions representing a particular occupation would 
better know the needs of that occupation and could provide informed advice 
about the issues that come up at the workplace. Second, these organizations 
would have a message for employees across the nation: join us as part of your 
professional and occupational identity. Just as attorneys have the American Bar 
114 See, e.g., ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 6-8; GETMAN, supra note 58, at 257-
301 (arguing for reforms aimed at improving efficient organization of unions). 
115 Matthew T. Bodie, The Next Iteration of Progressive Corporate Law, 74 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 739, 764-65 (2017) (“The progressive corporate law agenda must include changes to 
the statutory structure that would better accomplish the distribution of power within the 
firm.”). 
116 The internecine warfare at United Airlines in the 1990s between flight attendants, 
mechanics, and pilots provides one example. See Christopher Mackin, United It Was Not, 
OWNERSHIP ASSOCIATES (Jan. 1, 2003), https://www.ownershipassociates.com/united.shtm 
(“There are not many industries that are more occupationally segregated than the airline 
industry.”). 
117 See ESTREICHER & BODIE, supra note 26, at 36-39 (discussing the differences between 
the craft-based approach of the American Federation of Labor and the industrial-oriented 
approach of the Congress of Industrial Organizations). 
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Association and mechanical engineers have the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, unions could adapt themselves to serve not only as collective-
bargaining representatives, but also networks of continuing education, 
vocational identity, and political advocacy. Members of the occupation could 
join the union even if they were not represented, providing another source of 
funds for the organizations that could be earmarked for lobbying and campaign 
donations.118 Third, unions would be in a better position to aim for sectoral 
bargaining—bargaining with all of the employers in a particular sector. Sectoral 
bargaining has received significant attention as a new direction in labor law 
reform, and a guild-oriented approach would provide unions with a weightier 
argument to represent a set of workers across the sector.119
A specific occupational focus would also enable unions to use their pension 
funds more effectively in support of their membership. An ongoing dilemma for 
union leadership at pension funds is how to balance the plan’s need to maximize 
wealth for its beneficiaries with leadership’s desire to advance the interests of 
union members past, present, and future. Webber argues eloquently for the 
possibility of a combined approach, where the fund pursues opportunities that 
do not actively depress wages or encourage outsourcing while still pursuing 
profitable investment strategies.120 But a fund focused on a particular type of 
employee—and one that may even allow buy-in from members who are not 
within bargaining units—may have a stronger argument that it needs to follow 
the mission of the overall organization. A fund sponsored by the Carpenters 
Union should be able to say that it will invest its funds in a way that benefits its 
membership. Examples of programmatic investing include the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Company, which invests in jobs-related investment funds, and the 
National Electrical Benefit Fund, which serves as an investment manager for the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.121 Pension funds could join 
together for pro-worker and pro-shareholder initiatives, while at the same time 
pursuing investments that would benefit their own particular members. Care 
would need to be taken to avoid nepotism, kickbacks, or pet political projects.122
But there is a wide range of potential investments that avoid these pitfalls while 
still pursuing the interests of the organization as a whole. 
118 An occupational or professional orientation would open up the possibility of non-
employee associations for independent contractors. One such example is the Dramatists 
Guild, which provides model contracts and negotiating advice to dramatists and playwrights. 
See Matthew T. Bodie, Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the Platform Economy, 2017 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 17, 20-22 (2017). A more recently-created example is the Uber Guild, which 
provides Uber drivers with driving advice and a forum for the expression of workplace-related 
concerns. For a discussion of the pros and cons on nontraditional representation strategies 
such as the Uber Guild, see Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the 
Modern Economy, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1765-82 (2018). 
119 ANDRIAS & ROGERS, supra note 5, at 26-33; ROLF, supra note 28, at 37-44. 
120 WEBBER, supra note 3, at 197-98. 
121 Id. at 246-47. 
122 Id. at 195. 
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C. Worker Power in Society 
Worker power within corporate governance would change two important 
dynamics in our current political firmament. First, managers and shareholders 
would not be free to use corporate funds to assist political parties or candidates 
who seek to attack worker power and rights. FedEx, for example, has lobbied 
assiduously to escape labor-oriented regulation.123 If worker representatives 
were on the FedEx board, those directors could prevent, or at least frustrate, the 
use of company funds for anti-worker efforts. Second, worker representation 
would likely cut into the income inequality generated when management and 
capital control the operation of the business.124 Workers would be signficantly 
better positioned to demand higher compensation and object to excessive 
compensation for executives, shareholders (through buybacks), and outside 
consultants, investment bankers, and attorneys. Workers’ representatives would 
have the market, moral, and governance authority to actually question why the 
CEO has a golden parachute, why stock buybacks are not accompanied by wage 
increases, and why a fancy law firm is getting $1,000 an hour for its services. 
The reduction in income inequality would mean that founders, shareholders, and 
executives have smaller pools of wealth from which to draw. This would leave 
them with less money for, among other things, political donations. Certainly, 
other steps to address the huge campaign funding gap—such as additional 
campaign finance reform or a wealth tax—would have an even stronger effect. 
But a return to the income distributions of the 1950s would mean that staggering 
wealth would not be able to play the same role in our politics that it does today. 
Within this new political ecosystem, unions would still have a vital role. As 
suggested above, they would individually represent the interests of their 
memberships—workers who share a particular occupation or profession. They 
would be joined, on some matters, by the companies in their industry; for 
example, a nurses’ union could jointly advocate with hospitals to secure more 
funding for health care, nursing home care, or medical research—funding that 
helps both employers and employees.125 But at other times, when nurses’ 
interests are in conflict with hospitals, they would advocate separately. One can 
imagine this dynamic playing out against a wide variety of issues: each one will 
create a new kaleidoscope of different players supporting, opposing, or horse-
trading on the issue with other worker and industry groups. But when worker 
board representatives bring better balance to corporate and capitalist political 
123 See Fisch, supra note 92, at 1538-47 (highlighting FedEx’s attempts to argue its status 
as “exempt from the NLRA” and its regulation); Frank N. Wilner, RLA or NLRA? FedEx and 
UPS Follow the Money Trail, FED. LAW., Jan. 2010, at 40, 40. 
124 See Bodie, supra note 107, at 88-89. 
125 ANDY STERN, A COUNTRY THAT WORKS: GETTING AMERICA BACK ON TRACK 72 (2006) 
(discussing how SEIU Local 1199 worked with its political supporters in the state government 
to win “billions of dollars of reimbursements for the hospitals, which translated into stable 
balance sheets for the employers and excellent wages and the gold standard of benefits for 
hospital workers, including multi-million dollar training and upgrading funds for workers”). 
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spending, unions will be freed from the burden of representing all workers, in 
all ways and at all times, through their political activity. 
CONCLUSION
Our current system of collective bargaining is beset with endemic flaws that 
make it unrealistic to expect a return to the labor union heydays of the 1950s. 
Attempting to restore union glory solely through labor-law reforms would be a 
Sisyphean task. We can only break through if we provide workers with power 
directly in the governance of their firms. That power is critical to providing 
unions with the ability to represent a broader swath of workers, build strong and 
coherent organizations from within, and fill roles in the political ecosystem 
consistent with their organizational identities. Corporate power for workers is 
the surest route to protecting labor’s interests. 
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